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COMMENTS
ON THE CONVERGENCE OF THE PATENT AND
ANTITRUST STATUTES: SCM CORP.. V. XEROX CORP.
Case law concerning conflict between the patent and antitrust

laws has increased dramatically in recent years.' The increase is in part
the product of "the second patent crusade," a euphemism describing the

ongoing willingness of the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission to challenge court decisions that have drawn the line between
the patent and antitrust statutes.2 Private antitrust actions brought on
principles of patent misuse, patent fraud, and patent related conspiracy
have also added to the increase in case law.' The increase, however, is
fundamentally the product of theoretical divergence between the patent
' See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1981)
(United States challenge of validity, under antitrust laws, of territorially restricted licensing agreements); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., [1976-79 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 21,407 (F.T.C. Complaints and Orders, No. 9108) (April 5, 1978) (F.T.C. challenge of
patentee's monopoly position in market for patented chemical titanium dioxide); United States v.
CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 1976-1 Trade Cas. 60,908, 68,961 (D.N.J. 1976) (United States challenge
of patent licensing agreement containing provision forbidding bulk sales); notes 19-21, 23 & 48

infra.

, See Banner, The Patent System and the Antitrust Laws: Stabilization of the Tensions?, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 41-43 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Banner]; note 1 supra. Assistant Attorney-General Thurman Arnold launched the first patent crusade in 1938. See Banner, supra,at 41. The object of the first patent crusade was the elimination of the doctrine
enunciated in United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). W. BOWMAN, PATENT
AND ANTITRUST LAW 184 (1973). In GeneralElectric, the Supreme Court held that an owner

of a patented article does not violate the antitrust laws by disposing of the article directly
to consumers and fixing the price at which his agents transfer title. See 272 U.S. at 488. In
subsequent decisions, however, the Court retreated from its position in GE and held resale
price fixing schemes to violate the antitrust laws. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 389 (1948) (system of patent license agreements, entered into for purpose of fixing resale prices of product throughout industry, violate antitrust laws); United
States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 314-15 (1948) (cross-licensing agreements between
patentees of interdependent product patents, entered into for purpose of controlling prices
at which finished product is sold,-violate antitrust laws); United States v. Univis Lens Co.,
316 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1942) (features of patent licensing system that operate to maintain
resale prices on patented article violate antitrust laws); Ethyl Gas. Corp. v. United States,
309 U.S. 436, 455-57 (1939) (patent licensing system containing uniform conditions operating
to maintain resale prices of patented fluid violate antitrust laws).
' See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 104-05 (1969)
(private antitrust action challenging policy of patent pool that permitted licensing of certain
patents only in "package deal" that included numerous irrelevant patents); Walker Process
Equip. Inc. v. Food Mach. and Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 173 (1965) (private antitrust action
challenging validity of patent fraudulently obtained from patent office); Brulotte v. Thys
Co., 379 U.S. 29, 30 (1964) (private antitrust claim challenging "system" licensing arrangement whereby patentees obtained royalties on activities occurring after expiration of applicable patents); Dunlop Co. Ltd. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 484 F.2d 407, 417 (6th Cir. 1973)
(private antitrust claim challenging validity of territorially restricted licensing agreements).
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and antitrust laws.4 The antitrust laws, which prohibit the monopolization of any line of interstate or foreign commerce, 5 rest on the assumption that by maintaining a state of perfect competition, in which no
single competitor has the ability to manipulate the market price of its
goods, resources will be allocated to their most productive use.6 The patent laws are based on an assumption expressed in the Constitution
that a policy which grants to authors and inventors a limited but exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries will promote the
progress of science and the useful arts.8 The antitrust laws thus forbid
possession of precisely that which the patent laws confer to encourage
innovative activity, the power to monopolize by controlling prices or excluding competition. 9
In SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 10the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
focused recently on the conflict between the antitrust laws and the patent laws." In SCM, the Second Circuit considered whether a patentholder's refusal to grant licenses under his patents constituted an antitrust violation. 2 The case involved a conflict that arose from a series of
agreements between the Xerox Corporation (Xerox) and Battelle
3
Memorial Research Institute (Battelle).1
Through the agreements,
Xerox became the owner of Battelle's patents covering the process of
xerography approximately eight to ten years prior to the development

See notes 5-9 infra. Theoretical divergence between the patent and antitrust laws to
some extent produces the legal conflicts involving the statutes. From a theoretical perspective, the willingness of public and private plaintiffs to bring patent-antitrust claims is a
manifestation of this underlying theoretical divergence. See Ginsberg, Antitrust, Uncertainty, and Technological Innovation, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 635, 678-80 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Ginsberg].
With respect to actions brought by the Federal Trade Commission and Justice
Department, however, the increase is in part attributable to political and economic motivations. From a political perspective, the government's willingness to bring patent-antitrust
claims is a manifestation of the tendency of public agencies to maximize their jurisdiction.
See R. BARTLETT, ECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF POLITICAL POWER 21 (1973).
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-31 (1976); see notes 19-21, 23 infra.
See Ginsberg, supra note 4, at 640.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Section 8 confers upon Congress power to promote
the progress of science and the useful arts by securing to authors and inventors limited but
exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries. Id.
' See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976). Section 154 confers upon the patentee, for 17 years, the
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention. See note 48 infra.
' Compare 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976) with 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). See notes 21 & 48 infra;
United States v. DuPont & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380 (1956) (in determining whether one has
monopolized a given market, the ultimate question is whether one controls prices and competition therein).
10645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3765 (U.S., March 23, 1982).
'1
'
13

645 F.2d at 1203.
Id. at 1204-12.
Id. at 1198; see note 14 infra.
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of a relevant market for xerographic plain-paper copiers.' 4 Xerography is
a technique that permits quick and efficient duplication of printed pages
upon sheets of ordinary, uncoated paper' 5 Once Xerox rendered xerography commercially practicable, the technique quickly displaced other
methods of reproduction relying on conventional printing devices and
photographic paper. 6 By reason of its patent ownership, Xerox enjoyed
the position of being the world's only producer of xerographic, plainpaper copiers between 1960 and 1970.1
In 1973, SCM Corporation (SCM) brought an action in the Federal
District Court of Connecticut charging that Xerox had willfully acquired
and maintained monopoly power in a relevant market consisting of con" 645 F.2d at 1198. Xerox Corporation (Xerox) and the owner of the original
xerographic patents, Battelle Memorial Reserach Institute (Battelle), entered into four
agreements covering the xerography patents. Id. The parties entered into their first agreement in 1947. Id. Under the 1947 agreement, Battelle granted Xerox a non-exclusive and
nonassignable license to use the xerographic patents in the manufacture of machines designed
to produce less than twenty copies of a document. Id. Xerox agreed to pay Battelle an 8%
royalty and to sponsor xerography research at Battelle in the amount of $25,000 per year.
Id.
The second agreement, executed in 1948, eliminated the twenty copy limit and made
Xerox's license exclusive throughout the United States. Id. In addition, the 1948 agreement
imposed upon Xerox a duty to seek sublicensees under the patents, and provided that
Xerox was to pay Battelle 62% of any royalties Xerox might obtain through such sublicensing. Se SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp. 463 F. Supp. 983, 992 (D. Conn. 1978), aff'd 645 F.2d 1195
(2d Cir. 1981).
The third agreement, signed in 1951, increased Battelle's minimum royalty payment
and eliminated all territorial restrictions on Xerox's license. 463 F. Supp. at 992-93. Xerox's
duty to seek sublicensees continued unchanged. 645 F.2d at 1198. Xerox and Battelle
entered into their fourth agreement in 1956. Id In exchange for 55,000 shares of Xerox
stock, Battelle surrendered title to all of the original xerographic patents. Id. The conveyance extinguished Xerox'x duty to seek sublicensees under the second and third
agreements. Id. at 1199. Xerox, in return for annually sponsoring $25,000 of xerography
research at Battelle, obtained the right to receive all future xerographic patents and
technology Battelle might develop. Id. In addition, the agreement transferred to Xerox in
1959 title to certain related patents that Battelle already had developed. Id
, See 463 F. Supp. at 991-92; note 16 infra.
,6 645 F.2d at 1197-98. Xerography's chief advantage over its predecessors, the
mimeograph and the coated-paper copier, is its ability to reproduce images on ordinary
paper without the use of chemicals or conventional printing devices. Id. In the xerographic
process, complex patterns of light and darkness are transferred to a reusable photoconductive surface. See 463 F. Supp. at 991-92. The surface, storing the patterns in the form
of electrical charges, is then brought into contact with particles of toner, a substance similar
to ink. Id. The toner adheres to those portions of the surface that bear electrical charges until the surface is brought into contact with paper. Id Transferred to the paper, the toner
reproduces the original patterns of light and darkness without reliance on chemically-coated
paper or ordinary modes of printing. Id
" 645 F.2d at 1200. During the 1960s, Xerox produced both plain-paper copies and electrofax coated-paper copiers. Id. In 1964, following an infringement suit, Xerox granted SCM
limited licenses to manufacture xerographic coated-paper copiers, but not plain-paper
copiers. Id
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venience office copiers. 8 SCM alleged that Xerox's acquisition of the
xerographic patents in 1956 violated section 1 of the Sherman Act 9 and
section 7 of the Clayton Act. 0 In addition, SCM alleged that Xerox's continued holding of the patents and refusal to license anyone under them
violated section 2 of the Sherman Act2 ' and section 7 of the Clayton Act.'
Finally, SCM alleged that Xerox's Machine Utilization Plan, a volume
price discount arrangement, violated section 3 of the Clayton Act.' The
complaint sought damages for the profits SCM would have made had
Xerox not excluded SCM from the plain-paper copier market.24
The jury found that Xerox had violated sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act as well as section 7 of the Clayton Act by acquiring the
xerographic patents in 1956 and thereafter refusing to license anyone
under them.25 Additionally, the jury found that Xerox's Machine Utilization Plan constituted a violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act." The
463 F. Supp. at 985. A relevant market is that part of commerce, consisting of trade
in commodities that are reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes,
monopolization of which may be illegal. See United States v. DuPont & Co., 351 U.S. 377,
395 (1957); J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION, § 8.02[2] (1981).
" 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares illegal every contract,
combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce. Id; notes 44-49 infra.
1 463 F. Supp. at 1004-06, 1000-02; see 645 F.2d at 1209-10, 1210-1211; 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Section 7 of the Clayton Act generally prohibits the acquisition of stock
or assets when the acquisition's effect may be "substantiallyto lessen competition,"or"to tend
to create a monopoly" in any line of commerce. Id The statute contains exceptions relating
to common carriers, acquisitions made solely for the purpose of investment, and transactions consummated pursuant to the authority of certain federal agencies. Id. Violation of § 7
may occureither by acquiring, or continuing to hold, a given asset. See notes 50-56 infra.
2 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Section 2 provides that anyone who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any person or persons to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be guilty of a
felony. Id. Violation of § 2 may occur by either acquiring or continuing to hold a monopoly
"

position in a given market. See notes 57-63 infra.

463 F. Supp. at 1006-15, 1002-04; see 645 F.2d at 1208-09, 1211-12; note 20 supra.
2 463 F. Supp. at 1015-20; see 645 F.2d at 1212-13; 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976). Section 3 of the
Clayton Act makes it illegal to lease, sell, or contract to sell patented or unpatented articles
on the condition that the lessee or purchaser shall not use or deal in products of a competitor, where the effect may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a

monopoly in any line of commerce. Id; see note 26 infra.
2, 463 F. Supp. at 986. In SCM, SCM sought damages for lost profits resulting from
Xerox's refusal to license the plain-paper copier patents. Id. The alleged damages consisted
specifically of the financial benefits SCM would have received if licensed under the patents,
the losses SCM incurred in the placement of coated-paper copiers, and the losses SCM incurred in the placement of plain-paper copiers. Id
SCM also sought far-reaching equitable relief. Id. at 985. Neither the district court nor
the Second Circuit addressed SCM's equitable claims, however, because the district court
severed the equitable claims at the outset of trial. Id. at 985. SCM did not desire to pursue
the equitable claims until resolution of the damage issues. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.,
474 F. Supp. 589, 591 (D. Conn. 1979).
463 F. Supp. at 1023-25; see 645 F.2d at 1201-02, 1208.
463 F. Supp. at 1026-27. Xerox's Machine Utilization Plan (MUP) offered three levels
of billing discounts depending upon the number of copies made on the customer's leased
Xerox machines. Id. at 1015. Because the customer could combine the number of copies
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jury awarded SCM treble damages amounting to $111.3 million'.2 The
district court ruled, however, that notwithstanding the jury's findings,
Xerox's acquisition of and unilateral refusal to license under the patents
in question could not be a basis for a monetary damage award. 28 Since
the acquisition of patents for which there exists no relevant product
market cannot constitute an agreement in restraint of trade, the court
held that Xerox had not violated the antitrust laws by purchasing the
patents in 1956. As to Xerox's subsequent refusal to license -the
patents, the court held that while a refusal to license might be evidence
of some other anticompetitive conduct, the need to accommodate the patent laws with the antitrust laws precludes the imposition of damage
liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act for a Unilateral refusal to
license valid patents." Since the prospect of paying treble damages to
made on any combination of Xerox machines in determining the MUP discount, SCM contended that the MUP had the effect of coercing Xerox customers into retaining Xerox's lowvolume machines in order to enjoy the discount achieved on the high volume machines. Id.
at 1016. In spite of the jury's finding that the MUP did have a coercive effect, the district
court ruled that because undisputed evidence demonstrated that there was no causal relationship between MUP and the cancellation rate on low volume Xerox machines, the jury
lacked a sufficient basis from which to conclude that MUP caused the lost profits claimed by
SCM. Id at 1018-20. The Second Circuit affirmed on the absence of a causal link between
SCM's claim for lost profits and the MUP. 645 F.2d at 1213.
" 463 F. Supp. at 990; see 645 F.2d at 1197. The jury awarded treble damages pursuant to § 4 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Section 4 provides that anyone who is
injured in his business or property by reason of actions forbidden by the antitrust laws may
sue in federal district court and recover threefold the damages he sustained plus the cost of

suit. Id.

23 463 F. Supp. at 1020; see 645 F.2d at 1197. See also text accompanying notes 60-68
infra. Though entertaining serious doubts as to several of SCM's theories of liability, the
district court sent the SCM case to the jury because of SCM's allegations that Xerox and
several related entities had entered into an agreement to refuse to license the xerography
patents. 463 F. Supp. at 994; see 645 F.2d at 1201. Because the alleged agreement, if proven,
would constitute a classic violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, the district court
reasoned that the jury necessary to the resolution of the § I claim should also have the task
of finding the facts necessary for a ruling on SCM's other theories of liability. 463 F. Supp.
at 994; see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976); notes 44-49 infra. In spite of the jury's findings, which supplied the necessary factual elements to several of SCM's claims (other than the abovementioned section 1 claim), the district court ruled that Xerox was not liable to SCM under
the antitrust laws for any of its patent-related conduct. 463 F. Supp. at 1020; see id.at
1021-27 (jury answers to interrogatories). SCM did not pursue on appeal its claim that
Xerox entered into an agreement with others to refuse to license the xerography patents.
645 F.2d at 1201-02.
' 643 F. Supp. at 1005, 1010; see 645 F.2d at 1209, 1211. The district court in SCM adjudged Xerox's acquisition of the Battelle patents lawful even though the agreement
eliminated Xerox's duty under previous agreements to seek sublicensees. 463 F. Supp. at
1005. The court determined that it would be unwise to extend the antitrust laws to impose
upon the acquirer of experimental patents the risk of assessing the likelihood that a relevant market might develop in the future. Id. at 1000. On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld
the district court's finding that the policies underlying the patent system forbid the imposition of antitrust liability even though the development of the plain-paper copier market was
forseeable at the time of the agreement. 645 F.2d at 1209-10; see text' accompanying notes
37-49 infra.
1 463 F. Supp. at 1012-13.
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potential competitors for the profits they might have earned had they
received licenses would materially diminish the value of patents and
thereby pose a grave threat to the objectives of the patent laws, the
court concluded that the jury's findings were not a valid basis for an
award of monetary damages."
Finding on appeal that none of Xerox's patent-related conduct
violated the antitrust laws,3 the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's refusal to award monetary damages.3 SCM advanced three lines
of argument in attempting to overturn the district court decision. SCM
argued that because Xerox's market dominance was reasonably foreseeable in 1956, Xerox's acquisition of the xerographic patents violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act as well as section 7 of the Clayton Act.'
In addition, SCM alleged that Xerox's continued holding of the patents
once the relevant product market came into existence violated section 7
of the Clayton Act." Finally, SCM argued that the court should treat
Xerox's unilateral refusal to license under the patents like any other
refusal to deal by a monopolist and hold Xerox's conduct actionable
under the antitrust laws. 6
The Second Circuit rejected SCM's allegation that Xerox's acquisition of the patents violated section 2 of the Sherman Act.17 Section 2 prohibits any monopolization, attempt to monopolize or conspiracy to
monopolize interstate or foreign commerce. 8 SCM contended that an
agreement to purchase patents that eliminates an existing potential for
competition in a reasonably foreseeable economic market constitutes a
violation of section 2 if the agreement results in the acquisition of
monopoly power and imposes a restraint on trade that is greater than
necessary to induce the purchaser to develop and market the product involved. 9 The court declined to adopt the proposed rule, recognizing that
1IId.

at 1013-14. In SCM, the district court noted that a refusal to license patents

might constitute an antitrust violation sufficient to warrant equitable relief. Id at 1013.
Neither the district court nor the Second Circuit had need to consider the possibility of
equitable relief, however, because at the time of suit Xerox already was offering nonexclusive licenses at no royalty under its plain-paper copier patents. 463 F. Supp. at 994; see
645 F.2d at 1201. Xerox agreed to license its plain-paper copier patents in a consent decree
that terminated an action brought by the Federal Trade Commission in 1969. See [1970-73
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,164 (F.T.C. Complaints and Orders); 86 F.T.C.
364, 369 (1975) (consent decree).
2 45 F.2d at 1197.
Id. The SCM court declined to comment on the district court's suggestion that
equitable relief might be available to a plaintiff in SCM's position because at the time of
suit Xerox had consented to license its patents. Id.; see note 31 supra.
645 F.2d at 1197, 1204-11; see text accompanying notes 37-56 infra.
645 F.2d at 1211-12; see text accompanying notes 64-68 infra.
645 F.2d at 1204; see text accompanying notes 57-63 infra.
645 F.2d at 1207-09.
3 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976); note 21 supra.
3' 645 F.2d at 1208. The Second Circuit in SCM suggested that SCM introduced the
element of foreseeability in the patent acquisition analysis in order to escape an unfavorable
37

1982l

SCM CORP. v. XEROX CORP.

the rule would focus upon the potential for commercial success that a
particular patent might hold.4 0 Instead, the court analyzed the acquisition in terms of the then existing market power conferred by the patent
in relation to the market position then occupied by the acquiring party in
the relevant product market.4 The relevant product market for xerographic; plain-paper copiers did not come into existence, however, until at
least eight years after Xerox acquired the patents. 2 Reasoning that the
imposition of antitrust liability under such circumstances would seriously
undermine the incentives of the patent law system, the Second Circuit
held that the acquisition of patents prior to the development of a relevant product market did not constitute a violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. 3
The Second Circuit also declined to accept SCM's argument that
Xerox's patent acquisitions violated section 1 of the Sherman Act." Section 1 makes unlawful any contract, combination, or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce. 5 SCM maintained that because Xerox's
disposition of its antitrust claims because of the absence of a relevant product market at the
time of acquisition. Id.
40 Id.
11 Id In determining whether Xerox's acquisition of the xerographic patents violated
the antitrust laws, the SCM court found persuasive the reasoning of commentators on antitrust law that courts should analyze patent acquisitions in terms of existing market power.
Id.; see P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
AND THEIR APPLICATION
819 (2d ed. 1978). According to two commentators, courts should
determine whether the antitrust laws limit the patent rights of a party acquiring a patent on the
basis of the power already possessed by that party in the relevant market. Mdi.
42 645 F.2d at 1209. In SCM, SCM did not challenge the jury's finding that the relevant
product market did not come into existence until some time after 1964. Id In view of the
weight accorded by the Second Circuit to the nonexistence of a relevant product market in
the patent acquisition analysis, it is plausible that had the market existed, and had Xerox
possessed power in that market, the patent acquisitions would have violated the antitrust
laws. See 645 F.2d at 1205, 1206, 1209, 1211.
,1 Id. at 1209: The imposition of antitrust liability upon the acquirer of patents for
which, at the time of acquisition, there is no relevant market would seriously undermine the
incentives of the patent law system by discouraging commercial developers from investing
in research and development relating to experimental technology. Id The SCM court noted
that prior to the development of the relevant product market, Xerox contributed very
substantially to the development of the plain-paper copier. Id. In finding no violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, the court also noted that Battelle, the transferor of the
xerography patents, was not Xerox's competitor. Id.
Apparently, SCM v. Xerox is the first instance in which a court has had to decide
whether a unilateral refusal to license patents acquired prior to the development of a relevant product market constitutes an antitrust violation. See 463 F. Supp. at 994 (district
court judge remarking as to absence of authoritative precedent).
" 645 F.2d at 1209-12.
4515 U.S.C. § 1 (1976); see National Soc'y. of Professional Eng'rs. v. United States, 435
U.S.-679, 692-93 (1978) (canon of professional society prohibiting members from submitting
competitive bids for engineering services violates § 1 of the Sherman Act as manifesting
anticompetitive purpose and effect); Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
49 (1977) (in a § 1 analysis, factfinder must weigh all circumstances in deciding whether
given practice should be prohibited as imposing unreasonable restraint on competition);
note 19 supra.
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1956 patent acquisitions eliminated Xerox's duty under a previous
agreement to seek sublicensees, the acquisition was, in effect, an agreement in restraint of trade." The court responded, however, by referring
again to the need to protect the policies of the patent laws." Noting that
while in an economic sense Xerox might have acted unreasonably in
unilaterally refusing to license its plain-paper copier patents, the court
held that the lawfulness of their acquisition in 1956 rendered that conduct, expressly permitted by the patent laws," reasonable for purposes
of section 1.11
SCM made its final attack on Xerox's 1956 patent acquisitions under
section 7 of the Clayton Act." Section 7 prohibits the acquisition of
assets when the effect of the acquisition may lessen competition substantially or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.5 SCM
argued that the probable effect of the 1956 patents acquisition was
substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly in the
then foreseeable convenience office copier market." The Second Circuit
noted that in a section 7 analysis, one must examine the effects of an acquisition in each economically significant submarket to determine
whether a reasonable probability exists that the acquisition substantially
will tend to lessen competition." The court observed, however, that such
" 645 F.2d at 1209. In SCM, SCM argued that the 1956 acquisition agreement violated
§ 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), because absent the 1956 agreement, Battelle
would have enforced Xerox's contractual obligation under previous agreements to seek sublicensees, thus creating competition in the relevant market. Id.; see note 14 supra. SCM
urged that because Xerox foresaw commercial success and dominance over the convenience office copier market, the agreement giving Xerox power to eliminate all competition
within that market was unreasonable and, therefore, illegal. 645 F.2d at 1209.
'T Id.; see text accompanying note 43 supra.
" See *35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976). Section 154 provides in part:
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the
patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years .... of the right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the
United States, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof. (emphasis
added)
" 645 F.2d at 1210.
' See id.
51 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); see United States v. Lever Bros. Co.; 216 F.
Supp. 887, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (patents and trademarks constitute assets, acquisition of
which is subject to § 7 of Clayton Act); United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F.
Supp. 153, 181-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (as used in § 7 of Clayton Act, "assets" is a generic, imprecise term encompassing broad spectrum of transactions whereby something of value is
acquired by purchase, assignment, lease, license, or otherwise); note 20 supra.
" 645 F.2d at 1210. In SCM, SCM attacked Xerox's patent acquisitions under section 7
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), with benefit of the jury's finding
that the probable effect of the acquisition agreement was to lessen competition in the relevant convenience office copier market. See 463 F. Supp. at 1025. The jury's finding tracks
the actual wording of the Clayton Act. See note 20 supra.
3 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). The SCM court relied
on Brown for the proposition that the existing market provides the analytical framework in
which to measure the probability and extent of an acquisition's anticompetitive impact. 645
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an examination would not have been possible in 1956 when Xerox acquired the patents. 4 While section 7 involves the potential consequences
of particular acquisitions, the court reasoned that in examining the effects of an acquisition upon competition in a line of commerce,.a court
should confine its analysis to the potential consequences in "existing?'
lines of commerce.55 Since the relevant product market for xerographic
plain-paper copiers did not come into existence until at least eight years
after Xerox's patent acquisitions, the court held that the acquisitions did
not violate section 7 at the time they were made.5"
In addition to attacking Xerox's patent acquisitions, SCM argued
alternatively that Xerox's subsequent use of the patents violated the antitrust laws.' Reasoning that a court should treat a unilateral refusal to
license valid patents like any other refusal to deal-by a monopolist,-SCM
alleged that Xerox's refusal to license its patents violated section 2 of
the Sherman Act.58 In so arguing, SCM attempted to invoke the aid of a
line of cases holding that while a unilateral refusal to deal alone does not
violate the antitrust laws, a violation does occur when the refusal is
made in order to enhance or maintain a monopoly position in the relevant market."
F.2d at 1211; see 370 U.S. at 325. In Brown, the United States brought suit to enjoin a
merger of two corporations engaged in the manufacture and sale of shoes on the ground
that the merger's effect might be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in the production, distribution, and sale of shoes. Id. at 297. On the basis of the
district court's finding that the merger might have anticompetitive effects in the existifig
submarkets of men's, women's, and children's shoes, the Supreme Court upheld the issuance
of the requested injunction. Id. at 334-46.
645 F.2d at 1211.
" Id. The SCM court held that Congress infused § 7 with a speculative aspect in order
to permit courts to appreciate immediately the potential consequences that an acquisition
might have upon a line of commerce already susceptible of examination: Id. The court
declined to speculate as to both the potential for a market's development and the potential
consequences within the potential market. See id.
See 645 F.2d at 1204-07, 1211-12.
" See id. at 1204; note 21 supra.
' See 645 F.2d at 1204. Courts consistently have held that a unilateral refusal to deal,
made in order to enhance or maintain a monopoly position constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973) (refusal to
deal aimed at destroying threatening competition in electric power industry is illegal);
Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953) (one's right to
refuse to sell may violate Sherman Act if accompanied by unlawful agreement or conduct,
or if conceived in monopolistic purposes); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. -143,
154-55 (1951) (newspaper's refusal to accept local advertising from persons advertising
through competing radio station is impermissible under Sherman Act).
In United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300 (1919), the Supreme Court held that, absent
any purpose or intent to create a monopoly, a person engaged in an entirely private
business has the right to freely exercise his discretion as to the parties with whom he will
deal. Id. at 307. But see Unibrand Tire and Product Co. v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 429 F.
Supp. 470, 474 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (observing that the Colgate holding, while never having
been overruled, has been eroded almost to extinction).
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The Second Circuit conceded that a concerted refusal to license valid
patents constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws because in entering
into the refusal to license agreement, a patentee attempts to enlarge his
monopoly beyond the scope of the patent granted him." The court
observed, however, that when a patent-holder merely exercises his right
to exclude others from making, using, and selling the invention, the patent laws expressly permit his conduct." Noting that the power to exclude is the essence of the patentee's legal monopoly, and that no court
has ever required a patentee to forfeit the power of exclusion merely2
because his patent monopoly has evolved into an economic monopoly,
the SCM court held that when a patent's acquisition is lawful, subsequent conduct permissible under the patent laws does not create liability
under the antitrust statutes."
SCM urged also that Xerox's failure to license under the patents
after the development of a relevant product market constituted a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act because section 7's prohibition on ac' 645 F.2d at 1204; see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,
118-19, 133-40 (1969) (concerted refusal to license patents except on conditions requiring payment of royalties on products unrelated to patent's teaching constitutes antitrust violation);
United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 194 (1963) (cross-licensing, agreement between competitors violated antitrust laws where parties entered into agreement for purpose of foreclosing availability of licensing to foreign competitors); United States v. Line
Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 314-15 (1948) (antitrust laws violated where cross-licensing agreement contained provisions operating to exclude competitors and control resale prices of
patented products).
61 645 F.2d at 1204; see note 48 supra; text accompanying notes 66-68 infra.
6 See 645 F.2d at 1204. As the SCM case demonstrates, the distinction between a patent monopoly and an economic monopoly can become extremely tenuous. The term "patent
monopoly" refers to the right of the patentee to exclude everyone from making, using, or
selling the patented invention. See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 326, 328-29
(1852) (purchaser of patented device takes device beyond limits of patent monopoly and
patentee cannot force purchaser to pay royalties by reason of patent's extension). Insofar as
he possesses the right of exclusion, the patentee may be said to enjoy a monopoly over the
invention patented.
An economic monopoly, for purposes of the antitrust statutes, connotes possession of
the power to control prices or exclude competition within a given market. See United States
v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380 (1956). In DuPont the Supreme Court
affirmed a district court decision absolving DuPont of antitrust liability for alleged
monopolization of the market in cellophane. Id. at 404. The Supreme Court defined the relevant market for cellophane as the market for "flexible packaging materials" by looking to
reasonable interchangeability of materials to consumers and adaptability of materials to the
same purposes. Id. at 395-400.
Courts frequently have criticized the use of the term "monopoly" to describe the rights
of a patentee. In United States v. Dubller Condensor Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933), the
Supreme Court remarked that a patent is not, accurately speaking, a monopoly, since the
patent is not created at the expense and to the prejudice of all the community save the
grantee of the patent; Id. at 186; see United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co. 225 F. 800,
804-05 (1915) appeal dismissed, 247 U.S. 524 (1918) (no such thing as restraint in a trade
which has no existence).
645 F.2d at 1206.
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quisitions in restraint of competition comprehends both the initial acquisition and the subsequent retention of the asset in question. 4 Without
commenting on the scope of section 7 in other situations, the Second Circuit held that the policies of the patent law system required circumscribing the scope of section 7 in this particular context. 5 The court ruled
that when a corporation's acquisition of patents does not violate section
7, the subsequent holding of those patents does not later violate that section. 6 Since the seventeen year term provided by the patent laws limits
the restraint placed upon competition," the court reasoned that, in
deference to the patent laws, a court must tolerate the restraint
throughout the duration of the patent grant. '
Id at 1211. In SCM, in urging that Xerox's continued holding of the xerographic
patents violated § 7 of the Clayton Act, SCM relied on United States v. ITT Continental
Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223 (1975), and United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 353
U.S. 586 (1957).
In ITT Continental,the government brought an action seeking the imposition of civil
penalties under section 11 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1976), for alleged violations of
a consent decree forbidding ITT from acquiring bakeries during a designated period. 420
U.S. at 225. The Supreme court held that under § 7, acquisition is not a discreet transaction,
but a status that continues until the acquiring party undoes the transaction. I&Lat 242.
Because acquisition is a continuing event, the Supreme Court ruled that each day of
unlawful ownership constituted a separate violation of § 11 Id. at 243.
In DuPont, the United States challenged DuPont's acquisition of a 23% interest in the
General Motors Corporation. 353 U.S. at 588. DuPont had consummated the acquisition
some thirty years prior to the date of suit. Id-at 590. In finding that the acquisition violated
§ 7's prohibition on acquisitions entailing substantial anticompetitive effects, the Supreme
Court held that the test of a § 7 violation is whether, at the time of suit, there exists a
reasonable probability that the acquisition in question is likely to result in the condemned
restraints. Id. at 607.
While there is a superficial similarity between SCM's argument that Xerox violated §
2 of the Sherman Act by refusing to license the xerography patents and its argument that
Xerox violated § 7 of the Clayton Act by continuing to hold the xerography patents, the
arguments are analytically distinct. Section 2 prohibits monopolization and attempted
monopolization. See note 21 supra.Under § 2, SCM argued that Xerox's unilateral refusal to
license the patents constituted an act of monopolization. See notes 58-63 supra. Since
Xerox's market position was the product of the patent acquisitions, however, SCM was able
to allege a § 7 violation as well. Section 7 prohibits the acquisition of assets, the effect of
which may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly. See note
20 supra. Since the DuPont and ITT Continentaldecisions define acquisition as comprehending both the initial acquiring as well as the subsequent retaining of the asset in question,
SCM argued that Xerox's holding of the patents, quite apart from its use of them, violated §
7. See 645 F.2d at 1211.
5

rd.

Id. The SCM court did not address specifically the Supreme Court's reasoning in the
ITT Continental and DuPont decisions. Id; see 420 U.S. at 242; 353 U.S. at 607; note 64
supra. Rather, the court noted that regardless of the meaning ascribed to § 7 in other contexts, the need to protect the policies underlying the patent laws mandated that the court
hold that Xerox's retention of the plain-paper copier patents was not actionable under § 7
for purposes of monetary damages. 645 F.2d at 1211.
See note 48 supra.
645 F.2d at 1212.
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The SCM court properly rejected SCM's attempt to expand the antitrust laws to operate within the statutorily defined bounds of the patent monopoly. 9 Litigation in the patent-antitrust area traditionally has
focused upon attempts by patent holders to extend their monopolies
beyond the bounds of the patent statute.70 Courts have held that tying
arrangements, by which the patentee permits the use or sale of his invention only in conjunction with the purchase, from the patentee, of
some other article, constitute a misuse of patents sufficient to invoke the
antitrust laws.7' In addition, conditional licensing agreements, whereby
the patentee permits the manufacture of his invention only on the condition that certain fixed resale prices are observed, have resulted in the
imposition of antitrust liability." Courts have also found combinations of
patentees, patent pooling, and cross-licensing arrangements, the design
of which is to achieve or maintain monopolistic control over a given
89 See 645 F.2d at 1204. The statutorily defined bounds of the patent monopoly encompass only the patentee's right to exclude all others from making, using or selling the invention. See Crown Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 34 (1923) (government grants
only power to exclude others from making, using, or vending invention for 17 years);
Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 326, 328-29 (1852) (patent franchise consists only of
right to exclude everyone from making, using, or vending the thing patented); note 48
supra. The SCM court's holding permits a patentee to maintain,but not extend, his patent
monopoly through conduct acceptable under the patent laws. 645 F.2d at 1204 (emphasis in
original).
;a 463 F. Supp. at 997; see R. NORDHAUS & E. JUROW, PATENT & ANTITRUST LAW, 119
(1961); text accompanying notes 71-73 infra.
71 See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 394-96 (1947) (corporation owning patents on machines utilizing salt products violates Sherman Act by requiring
lessees of machines to use only corporation's unpatented products in connection with the
machines); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944) (owners of
system patent may not use patent to secure limited monopoly over unpatented device used
in practicing invention); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 456-57
(1922) (lease agreement containing convenants that permitted use of machines only on products upon which certain other operations had been performed violates § 3 of Clayton Act).
Tying arrangements impermissably extend the scope of the patent monopoly by restraining
competition in the market for the "tied" article, resulting in a limited monopoly that is not
within the patent grant. See Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942).
1' See e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 388-91 (1948) (conditional licensing agreements designed for purpose of controlling distribution and resale
price of patented article violate Sherman Act); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,
321 U.S. 707, 721 (1944) (distributor of trademarked article may not use conditional licensing
agreement to control prices at which purchaser resells to third persons). Ethyl Gas. Corp. v.
United States, 309 U.S. 458-459 (1940) (patent licensing system imposing resale'price restrictions exploits business not within patent monopoly).
A patentee extends the scope of his patent monopoly by controlling the resale price of
his invention because the initial sale of the invention exhausts the monopoly in it. See
Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 326, 328-29 (1852); United States v. Univis Lens
Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942) (aspects of licensing system which in themselves are lawful,
nonetheless violate Sherman Act when interwoven with scheme to enforce resale price
restrictions).
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market, to be impermissible under the antitrust statutes." SCM did not
allege, however, an antitrust violation by way of an illegal extension of
Xerox's patent monopoly. 4 SCM merely argued that because the patent
monopoly evolved into an economic monopoly, an antitrust violation occurred. 75 Since the patent laws expressly permit a patentee the right to
develop and hold his patent to the exclusion of others for a seventeen
year period, the SCM court correctly concluded that Xerox's mere
possession of a lawfully acquired patent monopoly did not create damage
liability under the antitrust statutes.76
When a patent-monopoly evolves into an economic monopoly, the
patentee's power to exclude is inherently similar to the power to
monopolize that is forbidden by the antitrust statutes.7 Imposition of
antitrust liability upon the patentee because his patent so evolves,
however, would be to punish not the patentee's conduct, but the potential for commercial success inherent in the patent.78 SCM's antitrust
arguments depart from the case law on the patent and antitrust statutes
by seeking to impose liability on the basis of the power possessed by the
patentee, not the extent to which the patentee has abused that-power by
exceeding his authority under the patent statute.79 The Second Circuit's
rejection of SCM's arguments establishes clearly that to the extent that
a patentee's conduct is within the patent laws, such conduct is immune
from the prohibitions of the antitrust laws. 0
7 See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 118 (1969) (patent pooling arrangement designed to exclude from given market persons not willing to
manufacture products locally violates § 1 of Sherman Act); United States v. Singer Mfg. Co.,
374 U.S. 174, 194 (1963) (cross-licensing agreement between competitors entered into for
purpose of foreclosing license availability to third persons violates § 1 of Sherman Act);
United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 378-80 (1952) (licensing agreements designed to restrain commerce and fix prices throughout relevant industry violate provisions of
Sherman Act). Combinations of patentees, patent pooling and cross-licensing agreements
may violate the antitrust laws by uniting individual patent monopolies in such a fashion that
the patentees obtain control over not only their limited monopolies, but also over the
market or industry in which the limited monopolies operate. See Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 283 U.S. 163, 174 (1931).
7' See 645 F.2d at 1204.

75

Id.

See id. at 1197; note 48 supra.The SCM court noted carefully in the beginning of its
opinion that the issue presented on appeal was not whether Xerox's conduct violated any
antitrust laws, but whether any of Xerox's conduct caused Xerox to incur damage liability
under the antitrust laws. See id. at 1202-03. The SCM court concluded, however, that on the
basis of the evidence presented, "none of Xerox's patent-related conduct contributed to any
antitrust violation." Id. at 1213. The SCM court's initial willingness to frame the issue in
terms of a possible violation of the antitrust laws may reflect a desire not to foreclose the
possibility of equitable relief to another plaintiff in SCM's position. See id. at 1197; 463 F.
Supp. at 998-1000; notes 31 & 33 supra.
See note 62 supra.
See 645 F.2d at 1208.
"'

79See notes 71-73 supra.

1 645 F.2d at 1204; see notes 60-63 supra.
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Sound policy considerations also support the Second Circuit's refusal
to premise antitrust liability for a patent acquisition upon the potential
for commercial success that the particular patent may hold. Under present patent law, a commercial developer can acquire a patent which
demands a substantial investment of time and money secure in the
knowledge that if not misused, the patent will remain exclusively his for
a limited period.8 Should the patent prove commercially successful, the
developer can be certain of recouping his investment.8 Under a line of
analysis that focuses upon potential for commercial success, the legality
of the patent acquisition would turn upon the foreseeability of distant
economic consequences in a hypothetical, but presently nonexistent
market. 3 The commercial success analysis would thus deprive the
developer not only of the certainty of an exclusive fight with which to
recoup his investment, but also of meaningful standards on which to
base his acquisition decisions in the first instance.
The decision in SCM does not mean, however, that plaintiffs genuinely harmed by patent monopolies that have become economic monopolies may not obtain some form of equitable relief. The Second Circuit specifically left open the question of whether equitable relief may be
available to a plaintiff in SCM's position. 5 Policy considerations provide
persuasive support for the proposition that equitable relief may not
undermine the purposes of the patent laws to the extent that monetary
"I See note 48 supra. Only two instances exist in which courts have found patent acquisitions to violate the antitrust laws. See Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952); United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp.
304 (E.D. Mich. 1951), affd, 343 U.S. 444 (1952). In both cases, the conduct transcending the
antitrust laws clearly was the acquisition of patents as part of a design to obtain
monopolistic control over the relevant product market. See 198 F.2d at 423; 96 F. Supp. at
307.
In Kobe, the court found that a patent-holding company attempted to create a monopoly in the hydraulic pump market through its acquisition, over a period of twelve years, of
all important patents relating to hydraulic pumps. 198 F.2d at 423. While noting that
agreements creating patent pools are not in themselves illegal, the Kobe court held that
such agreements when made for the purpose of restraining trade or creating a monopoly
are violations of the antitrust laws. Id. at 422.
Besser involved an agreement between the two principal competitors in the concrete
block market and the owners of patents that covered the essential components of
blockbuilding machines. 96 F. Supp. at 306. The agreement provided that Besser Manufacturing Co. (Besser) and the other dominant competitor would receive rights under the
patents, and the patentees would issue no further licenses without the consent of all parties
to the agreement. Id. at 310. The court held that the agreement, which made it virtually impossible for anyone else to obtain licensing under the patents, gave Besser and its counterpart
the power to restrict both present and future competition.Id at 311.Focusing on the combination created by the agreement, the court ruled that the agreement violated the provisions of
the Sherman Act. Id. at 313-14.
82 See generally Ginsberg, supra note 4.
See 645 F.2d at 1208.
84 See 645 F.2d at 1211; 463 F. Supp. at 1000.
645 F.2d at 1197.
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damages could impair these goals.86 Unlike an award of monetary
damages, an injunction prohibiting a patentee from continuing to refuse to
license his patents would impose no financial penalty on the patentee.17 An
injunction would merely prevent the patentee from further exercising his
exclusionary rights under the patent laws, leaving him free to profit by
licensing arrangements flowing from the injunction.8 Since equitable
relief would operate to restrict a patentee's statutory rights only after his
patent monopoly has developed into an economic monopoly and the
patentee has received a considerable financial return on his investment,
such relief may not unacceptably discourage the development of patented
products."
Despite policy considerations favoring equitable relief, an uninterrupted line of Supreme Court decisions indicates that there is no duty to
license a validly obtained patent. 0 Although the Supreme Court has
See 463 F. Supp. at 998-1000. A major example of the imposition of equitable relief
upon a defendant who violated the antitrust laws while, at the time of violation, he had no
significant reason to suppose that his patent-related conduct was illegal is United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 346-51 (D. Mass. 1953), affd 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
In United Shoe the district court refused to order the dissolution of the defendant corporation into three separate manufacturing companies to remedy the effects of the defendant's
monopolization of the shoe-making machinery industry. 110 F. Supp. at 348. The court also
refused to prohibit the defendant from entering into lease agreements relating to its
patented machinery. Id. at 349. The court felt that a flat prohibition on leasing would be
undesirable until milder remedies were attempted and proven unsuccessful. Id. at 348-49.
But see Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 245 F. Supp. 258 (M.D. Pa. 1965)
(subsequent suit for $4 million damages), vacated in part on other grounds, 392 U.S. 481
(1968).
Congress, however, apparently does not perceive a distinction between antitrust violations warranting equitable, as opposed to monetary, relief. See 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980). Section 5 of the Clayton Act provides that a final judgment or decree in an action
brought by or on behalf of the United States to the effect that a defendant has violated the
antitrust laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in a subsequent proceeding brought by a third party as to all matters respecting which the first judgment
would be an estoppel between the original parties. Id. Section 5 also provides that nothing
therein shall be construed as imposing any limitation upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel, except with respect to certain findings of the Federal Trade Commission. Id. Section 5
makes clear that had the United States obtained a decree prohibiting Xerox from continuing to refuse to license its plain-paper copier patents, SCM could have commenced its action
for monetary damages with benefit of certain findings made in the prior action. See Berkley
Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404, 438-39 (S,D.N.Y. 1978) (observing that suggestion of differences between equity and damages under antitrust laws is premised upon
inaccurate supposition of sharp dichotomy between equitable and monetary relief), modified
on other grounds 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
"See 463 F. Supp. at 998-1000.
u Id.
" See 463 F. Supp. at 1012-13.
0 See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohi & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (refusal to
license patent does not constrict remedies available to redress patent's contributory infringement because essence of patent is right to exclude); Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S.
370, 376 (1945) (plainly legitimate to employ patent as means of preventing appropriation of
related patent); Hartford Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 432-33 (1945) (elimina-
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ordered compulsory licensing of patents to remedy the effects of an
lready adjudicated antitrust violation,91 the Court has held clearly that
the very essence of the patent grant is the power to exclude others from
profiting by the patented invention." To allow the antitrust laws to
operate within the defined bounds of the patent monopoly therefore
would not be a proper accomodation of the two statutes. Allowing the antitrust laws to operate within the patent monopoly would strike at the
93
very heart of the patent grant.
In the two narrowly defined areas of nuclear engineering and air
pollution control, Congress has taken the initiative of compelling patent
licensing.94 Thereby Congress has indicated the desirability of limiting a
patentee's ability to exercise his power of exclusion in certain circumstances. Since both of the areas relate directly to technology that is
crucial to the preservation of public safety and health, a plausible argument exists that compulsory patent licensing is not warranted where
public safety and health considerations are absent. At the very least, to
require patent licensing in areas where Congress has chosen to remain
silent is to run the risk of treading on ground that is properly legislative,
not judicial.95
tion of district court decree enjoining defendant from filing applications for patents defendant did not intend to use because decree inconsistent with patentee's privilege of unilateral
refusal); Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908)
(power of exclusion is central to patent grant and patentee may exercise or not exercise
power without question of motive).
"' See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 351-54 (D. Mass.
1953), affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (corporation enjoined from violating § 2 of Sherman Act by
monopolizing trade in commercial shoemaking equipment).
See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980); note 90 supra.
9 See 645 F.2d at 1204.
, See 42 U.S.C. § 2188 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (Supp. III 1979). Section 2188 provides
that a court may require the owner of a patent relating to the production or utilization of
nuclear energy to license the patent on reasonable terms if the patentee has employed his
patent in a fashion that violates the antitrust laws. 42 U.S.C. § 2188 (1976).
Section 7608 provides that if the Attorney General finds that a patent right not
reasonably available to applicants is necessary to enable any person to comply with the provisions of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1976), that
there are no reasonable alternatives to such compliance, and that the unavailability of such
right may substantially lessen competition in any line of commerce, the Attorney General
may request district court to issue an order requiring the owner of the patent to license on
reasonable terms. 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (Supp. III 1979).
" The two instances in which courts have refused to enjoin the infringement of valid
patents turn significantly upon compelling public health and safety considerations. See
Wisconsin Alum. Research Fndtn v. Vitamin Technologists Inc., 146 F.2d 941, 944 (9th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 876 (1945); City of Milwaukee-v. Activated Sludge Inc., 69 F.2d
577, 593 (7th Cir.)- cert. denied 293 U.S. 576 (1934). Wisconsin involved a patent covering a
process of irradiation that dramatically increases the vitamin D content of certain animal
fats. 146 F.2d at 942. The patentee refused to license the patent in connection with the production of oleomargarine. Id. after noting that oleomargarine is a food used widely by the
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In addition, the imposition of antitrust liability under the circumstances presented in the SCM case would severely frustrate the objectives of the patent law system. By punishing only those patent
monopolies that ripen into economic monopolies, the Sherman Act and
Clayton Act would be punishing precisely those innovations that society
regards as most valuable."6 A truly successful innovation, which is the
very thing the patent law system attempts to promote, would confront
its creator with the unhappy choice of either relinquishing his exclusive
rights or risking severe liability 7 While the prospect of equitable relief
is not as extreme as treble damage liability, given the effect that the
possible imposition of treble damage liability would have on willingness
to invest in innovative activity, the question remains whether the
benefit society would receive in shortening the monopoly outweighs its
cost. The question is especially troublesome in view of a patent's limited
seventeen year duration. Left untouched, a patent expires on its own. 8
The Second Circuit reached the corfect result in SCM Corp. v. Xerox
Corp.9 9 While the court's decision does not change existing patentantitrust law, the opinion makes express what has long been implicit in
previous cases involving the conflict between the patent and antitrust
laws. A patentee cannot violate the antitrust laws by exercising rights
that have been freely and purposely given him.' 0 To that extent, the
decision represents a simple and workable solution to the problem of
drawing a line between statutes that might appear to be mutually exclusive. The patentee is subject to the antitrust laws only upon exercising rights which the patent laws do not confer upon him. 10
JOHN M. BLOXOM IV

poor, and that sales of unirradidated oleomargarine are forbidden by law in many countries,
the court refused to enjoin the infringement. Id.
In Activated, the owner of a patent covering a process for the treatment of raw
sewage brought suit to enjoin the patent's infringement by the City of Milwaukee. 69 F.2d
at 593. Observing that the injunction would result in the disposal of raw sewage into the
waters of Lake Michigan, thereby imperilling the safety and health of the public, the court
refused to grant the requested injunction. Id.
"See generally Ginsberg, supra note 4.
" See 645 F.2d at 1208. The antitrust laws permit a successful private plaintiff to
recover treble damages incurred as a result of the forbidden conduct. See note 27 supra. On
the SCM facts, the treble damage award would have totaled $111.3 million. 645 F.2d at 1197.
" See note 45 supra.
" 645 F.2d 1195.
1® See notes 7 & 8 supra.
001 645 F.2d at 1204.

